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ARTICLE
ETHICAL INTERSECTIONS & THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT:
AN APPROACH FOR GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEYS
BY PAUL FIGLEY*
John Quincy Adams,1 Abraham Lincoln,2 and Millard Fillmore3
agreed on one key public administration concern—Congress should not de-
cide private claims against the government. This truism eventually led Con-
gress to enact the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA” or “the Act”). The Act
allows recovery on a broad range of cases to persons injured by government
negligence, but its exceptions and exclusions can bar other claims entirely.
It successfully transfers responsibility for deciding disputed tort claims
from Congress to the courts.
* Associate Director, Legal Rhetoric Program, American University Washington College
of Law, where he teaches Torts and Legal Rhetoric & Writing. Formerly Deputy Director, Torts
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, where his responsibilities included
the defense of many of the cases discussed in this article. The author thanks Kimberly Harding
and Adeen Postar for their research assistance.
1. See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong. 49 (1942) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463] (quoting
John Quincy Adams) (“There is a great defect in our institutions by the want of a court of Excheq-
uer or Chamber of Accounts. [Deciding private claims] is judicial business, and legislative assem-
blies ought to have nothing to do with it. One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and
there is no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided . . . . A deliberative assembly
is the worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.”).
2. See id. at 46 (quoting Abraham Lincoln) (citing First Annual Message to Congress,
CONG. GLOBE, 37th CONG., 2D SESS. PT. III, APP.  (1861)) (“The investigation and adjudication of
claims in their nature belong to the judicial department.”).
3. See 6 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 2627 (1908). President Fillmore reasoned that:
Congress has so much business of a public character that it is impossible it should give
much attention to mere private claims, and their accumulation is now so great that many
claimants must despair of ever being able to obtain a hearing. It may well be doubted
whether Congress, from the nature of its organization, is properly constituted to decide
upon such cases.
Id. (citing First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1850)).
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A swirl of competing interests results from the structure of the FTCA,
the deep pocket it grants successful claimants, the complete immunity it
provides some tortfeasors,4 and the methods Congress chose for paying set-
tlements and judgments awarded under its auspices. Government attorneys,
responsible for administering the FTCA and defending litigation brought
pursuant to its procedures, must balance these competing interests. These
attorneys regularly confront issues that involve tensions among plaintiffs,
individual defendants, and federal agencies. The manner in which they re-
solve those problems can have dramatic consequences for the individuals
and entities involved.
This article suggests an ethical approach for government attorneys to
follow when making decisions in the special context of the FTCA. Part I
reviews the history and purpose of the FTCA, the Judgment Fund,5 and the
Westfall Act.6 Part II touches on the ethical obligations of government at-
torneys. Part III discusses how the FTCA functions in practice, the various
considerations at play in applying its rules to plaintiffs, federal employee
defendants, and federal agencies, and the ethical issues that arise in the
FTCA context. Part IV suggests that government attorneys responsible for
administering the FTCA affirmatively help claims enter the FTCA’s adjudi-
catory system and then treat each claim equally by raising every reasonable
defense in every case.
I. THE STATUTORY BACKDROP
A. The History & Purpose of the FTCA
For a century and a half, the only practical recourse for citizens injured
by the torts of federal employees was to ask Congress to enact private legis-
lation affording them relief.7 This was necessary because the United States’
sovereign immunity, grounded in the Appropriations Clause of the Consti-
4. The Act provides complete immunity to government employees for common law torts
they commit within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2006). It has been used
to grant immunity to non-governmental entities. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006); Pub. L. No.
101-512, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450) (tribal employees and
contractors).
5. The Judgment Fund is the funding source for FTCA judgments and most FTCA settle-
ments. See 31 U.S.C. § 1304; discussion infra Part I.B.
6. The Westfall Act substitutes the United States as defendant in the place of federal em-
ployees sued for common law torts within the scope of their employment and provides them
immunity. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), 100 Pub. L. No. 694, § 2, 102 Stat. 4563; discussion infra Part I.C.
7. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 24–25 (statement of Assistant
Att’y Gen. Francis M. Shea); James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862, 1888–92 (2010); LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS § 2.01 (2009) (noting alternative of personally suing government employee “of doubtful
financial resources”).
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tution, protected it from suit.8 The clause states: “No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law . . . .”9
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a sovereign state can
be sued only to the extent that it has consented and that only its legislative
branch can give such consent.10 Consequently, the United States cannot be
sued for damages unless Congress has enacted an applicable waiver of sov-
ereign immunity.11 Such a waiver must be express; it may not be implied.12
Accordingly, the United States could not be sued in tort until Congress
passed a statute waiving the government’s sovereign immunity for such
suits.13
8. While the origins, validity, and value of the doctrine of sovereign immunity are beyond
the scope of this essay, the United States’ sovereign immunity for suits seeking money damages is
grounded in the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see
also Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1248–58 (2009) (chronicling the history of the Appropriations Clause in the
United States); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 437 n.192 (2010) (“The most plausible textual source for federal sovereign immunity
[from money damages] is the Appropriations Clause.”).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The first half of the clause is the Appropriations Clause. The
second half is the Statement and Accounts Clause that states, “and a regular Statement and Ac-
count of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
Id.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (stating that the principle that
power to consent is reserved to Congress is central to our understanding of sovereign immunity);
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (“Consent alone gives jurisdic-
tion to adjudge against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power
is void . . . . Public policy forbids the suit unless consent is given, as clearly as public policy
makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of the legislative body.”).
11. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941)) (“Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action
against the United States, ‘there is no jurisdiction . . . in any . . . court to entertain suits against the
United States.’”); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he government is not
liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law.”); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.”).
12. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992), and Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)); U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 514 (“Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a
sovereign.”).
13. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. Prior to enacting the FTCA, Congress did pass measures
waiving sovereign immunity for various non-tort claims against the government. See, e.g., Court
of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (repealed 1982); Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505
(1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (2006)). Congress also passed waivers of
sovereign immunity pertaining to governmental torts in specific settings or circumstances. See,
e.g., Act of June 16, 1921, ch. 23, 42 Stat. 29, 63 (providing remedy to persons injured by Post
Office operations); Railroad Control Act of 1918, ch. 25, § 10, 40 Stat. 451, 456 (creating remedy
against the United States for claims arising from the government’s operation of railroads and
utilities under its wartime authority); Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 828, 843 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006)) (granting Forest Service authority “to reimburse owners of horses,
vehicles, and other equipment lost, damaged, or destroyed while being used for necessary
firefighting, trail, or official business”).
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Members of Congress had long recognized that legislation was a poor
way to resolve private claims against the government.14 By the twentieth
century, congressional procedures for addressing private claims were well
established but remarkably inefficient.15 The process was subject to inter-
minable delays and arbitrary actions.16 Congress could not promptly and
effectively decide tort claims on their merits.17 In 1926, Congressman Cel-
ler explained that the “Committee on Claims ha[d] no facilities nor ha[d]
the members time or inclination to pass upon questions of negligence and
contributory negligence, to sift evidence, and determine a host of mat-
ters.”18 The committee considered claims in ex parte proceedings without
cross-examination of witnesses.19
The process of considering and processing claims was also a substan-
tial burden on the time and attention of Congress.20 Typically a Congress
would consider thousands of private claims bills but enact relatively few.21
Appointment to the Committee on Claims was burdensome “not only be-
cause of the number of claims submitted but because of the realization that
careful judicial consideration of the claims [was] for the most part impossi-
14. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 49–55 (including comments
dating from 1832 to 1941 by congressmen criticizing the private claims bills system).
15. In 1926, the House of Representatives procedure for enacting such a private bill called
for the claim to be referred to the Committee on Claims. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463, supra note 1, at 51 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 13–14 (1926) (Supplementary Report of
Congressman Emanuel Celler)). If the committee took favorable action, the claim would be for-
warded to the House where it would be placed on the Private Calendar. Id. Any member could
strike it from that calendar for any reason. Id.
16. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of Congressman
Luce) (noting waste of time and inequity of procedures and stating that “nothing is so disgraceful
in the conduct of the Congress . . . as its treatment of claims”).
17. See id. at 51–52. The House Report also quotes the 1926 statement of Massachusetts
Congressman Charles L. Underhill, which reads:
The power vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims is tremendous and abso-
lutely wrong. I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your claim or I can take up each
and every one of your claims to suit my convenience.
. . .
I have one case that has passed five different Congresses, one branch or the other, and
has failed of passage in both branches the same year, not because it did not have justifi-
cation but because it was too late; it got caught in the jam; it could not get through; and
these claimants have been waiting all of these years for relief for the payment of a debt
which the United States owes them.
Id. (citing 67 CONG. REC. 7526 (1926)).
18. Id. at 51 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 14 (Supplementary Report of Congressman
Emanuel Celler)). Congressman Ross Collins of Mississippi commented that the consideration
given to private bills “by the individual membership was trifling.” Id. at 53 (citing Hearing Gen-
eral Tort Bill Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong. 6–8 (1932)).
19. See id. at 54 (statement of Congressman Robison).
20. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945);
Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at app. II, 49–55.
21. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, app. III, at 56 (“Private Claim Bills
before several Recent Congresses”).
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ble.”22 Members of the committee simply could not know the details of
each of the thousands of claims considered in every Congress.23
Congress debated proposals for a general tort claims act for decades.24
In 1929, both houses of Congress passed such a bill, but it was pocket-
vetoed by President Coolidge, apparently because it would have authorized
an agent of Congress, the Comptroller General, to represent the United
States in the Court of Claims.25 In 1940, the House passed a bill similar to
the FTCA, but more “urgent matters” relating to World War II kept the
Senate from considering it.26 On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt
urged Congress to enact a general tort claims act so that Congress and the
executive branch would no longer be diverted from larger issues.27 He
noted that in the three previous Congresses, less than twenty percent of the
proposed 6300 private claim bills became law and that they accounted for a
third of the bills he had vetoed.28
Congress affirmatively wanted to compensate persons injured by a
broad range of common law government torts.29 The private bill system and
various limited waivers of sovereign immunity had tacitly recognized an
obligation to compensate.30 Congress sought to replace the private bill sys-
tem with a “well-defined, continually operating machinery to redress
wrongs arising out of Government activity.”31 Congress intended for the
new system to provide an “effective and readily available remedy” that in-
cluded “judicial consideration of tort claims against the Government.”32 It
also intended that the new system protect certain government activities
from tort litigation33 and limit the damages paid.34 Congress met these
22. Id. app. II, at 50 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 1–3 (1926)).
23. Id. at 54 (quoting Debates on H.R. 7236, 86 CONG. REC. 12016 (1940)).
24. See generally id.; JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 7, §§ 2.09–.10.
25. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Assistant Att’y
Gen. Francis M. Shea); id. at 41 (citing 70 CONG. REC. 4836 (1929)). The memorandum following
the committee recounted: “The Attorney General objected to the act because it placed the Comp-
troller General in charge of appeals to the Court of Claims from his own decisions, and the act
received a pocket veto by President Coolidge.” Id.; see also O.R. McGuire, Tort Claims Against
the United States, 19 GEO. L.J. 133, 134–35 (1931) (discussing the history of President Coolidge’s
pocket veto).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). See also H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4–6 (1940).
27. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1–2 (1942). The Roosevelt Administration, through the De-
partment of Justice, was actively involved in drafting proposals for a general tort claims act. See,
e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 6–36 (statement of Assistant Att’y
Gen. Francis M. Shea); Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. 1 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 76th Cong. at 15–31 (1940) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the
Att’y Gen.); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 7, § 2.10.
28. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1.
29. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 37.
30. Id. at 39, 40, 45.
31. Id. at 45.
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 44–45.
34. See id. at 43; 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (barring recovery for “interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages”).
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goals when it enacted the FTCA as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946,35 and President Truman signed it into law on August 2,
1946.36
B. The Judgment Fund
While the basic structure of the FTCA has remained largely un-
changed, Congress has altered the procedures for paying FTCA judgments
and settlements. The Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion37 requires a specific funding source for any government payment, in-
cluding settlements and court-ordered judgments.38 The long-established
rule is that agency appropriations cannot be used to pay judgments against
the United States or its agencies, absent specific authorizing legislation.39
Such legislation could be an appropriation for particular settlements or
judgments, a general appropriation for categories of settlements or judg-
ments, or a statute that authorizes payments from a pre-existing
appropriation.40
As initially enacted in 1946, the FTCA authorized the use of agency
appropriations to pay settlements of up to $100041—later amended to
35. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (current ver-
sion found within 28 U.S.C.). The Legislative Reorganization Act also established the organiza-
tion of congressional committees, id. at tit. I, II; regulated lobbying, id. at tit. III; eliminated the
need for congressional approval of each new bridge, id. at tit. V; and altered congressional pay, id.
at tit. VI.
36. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675 (1946). The Legislative Reorganization Act drastically reduced
the burden that private claim bills would have on Congress because Title I of that act prohibited
such bills in circumstances where the FTCA might provide a remedy. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat.
812. The pertinent section reads:
SEC. 131. No private bill or resolution (including so-called omnibus claims or pension
bills), and no amendment to any bill or resolution, authorizing or directing (1) the pay-
ment of money for property damages, for personal injuries or death for which suit may
be instituted under the [FTCA] . . . shall be received or considered in either the Senate
or the House of Representatives.
Id. at 831.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
38. 3 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-978SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL AP-
PROPRIATIONS LAW § 14-31 to -32 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter GAO-08-978SP] (citing Office of
Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424–26 (1990)), available at http://www.gao.gov/spe-
cial.pubs/d08978sp.pdf.
39. Id. §§ 14-30 to -44. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006) (settlements for less than $2500).
The rare exceptions include non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, GAO-08-978SP at § 15-266,
and the U.S. Postal Service. 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-94-33, PRINCI-
PLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW §§ 14-34 to -37 (2d ed. 1994), available at http://www.
gao.gov/special.pubs/og94033.pdf.
40. See GAO-08-978SP, supra note 38, §§ 14-31 to -32.
41. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 843,
provides in part:
SEC. 4.03 CLAIMS OF $1,000 OR LESS
. . .
(c) Any award made to any claimant pursuant to this section, and any award, compro-
mise, or settlement of any claim cognizable under this title made by the Attorney Gen-
eral pursuant to section 413, shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency concerned
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$2500.42 Judgments and settlements in excess of that amount could not be
paid until Congress specifically appropriated money to pay them.43 The re-
current need to make appropriations for judgments entered under a number
of statutes caused an administrative burden on Congress and unnecessary
delays in the payment of valid judgments. To solve these problems, in 1956
Congress created the Judgment Fund—a permanent, indefinite appropria-
tion for the payment of judgments of up to $100,000.44 Under the new pro-
cedure, any FTCA judgment for that amount or less was paid
automatically.45 The legislation successfully reduced the administrative
burdens of the old regime, the delays in payments, and the irritations associ-
ated with the delays.46 In 1961, Congress amended the law to allow similar
use of the Judgment Fund to pay settlements of up to $100,000.47 Settle-
ments and judgments in excess of $100,000 continued to require a specific
appropriation authorizing payment until 1977, when Congress opened the
Judgment Fund to pay, inter alia, any FTCA judgment regardless of amount
and any FTCA settlement for more than $2500.48
The Judgment Fund is an open-ended appropriation available to pay
“final judgments, awards, compromise settlements, and interest and costs
specified in the judgments or otherwise authorized by law when—(1) pay-
ment is not otherwise provided for; (2) payment is certified by the Secretary
of the Treasury; and (3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable
under” the specified authorities, one of which is the FTCA.49 It was created
and is used primarily to pay judgments and settlements negotiated by the
Department of Justice.50 The Judgment Fund is not “an all-purpose fund for
out of appropriations that may be made therefor, which appropriations are hereby
authorized.
42. An Act to amend title 28 of the United States Code to increase the limit for administra-
tive settlement of claims against the United States under the tort claims procedure to $2500 is
found at 86 Pub. L. No. 238, 73 Stat. 471 (1959).
43. See GAO-08-978SP, supra note 38, § 14-31.
44. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 84-814, § 1302, 70 Stat. 678,
694–95 (July 27, 1956) (now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)). The statute provided, inter
alia:
There are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
and out of the postal revenues, respectively, such sums as may hereafter be necessary
for the payment, not otherwise provide for, as certified by the Comptroller General, of
judgments (not in excess of $100,000 in any one case) rendered by the district courts
and the Court of Claims against the United States which have become final together
with such interest and costs as may be specified in such judgments or otherwise author-
ized by law. . . .
Id.
45. Id.
46. H.R. REP. NO. 87-733, at 2, 4 (1961); see also H. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2 (1961).
47. Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, § 2, 75 Stat. 415, 416 (1961).
48. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, ch. 14, 91 Stat. 61, 96–97
(1977).
49. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
50. See GAO-08-978SP, supra note 38, § 14-34.
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judicial disbursement.”51 Rather, it can be used “only on the basis of . . . a
substantive right to compensation based on the express terms of a specific
statute.”52 The Judgment Fund is not available to pay a settlement that ex-
ceeds the authority of the government attorney who purportedly agreed to
it.53
C. The Westfall Act
One other amendment to the FTCA is pertinent to this discussion.
Prior to 1988, as a general rule federal employees “were absolutely immune
from personal liability in State common law tort actions for harm that re-
sulted from activities within the scope of their employment.”54 Federal em-
ployees also had statutory immunity for suits arising from their operation of
motor vehicles under the Federal Driver’s Act, which provided that the
United States be substituted as defendant in such cases.55 In 1988 the Su-
preme Court held in Westfall v. Erwin that federal employees are absolutely
immune from suit for common law torts only if they were acting within the
scope of employment and exercising discretionary functions.56 The Court
invited Congress to give more direction, stating: “Congress is in the best
position to provide guidance for the complex and often highly empirical
inquiry into whether absolute immunity is warranted in a particular context.
Legislated standards governing the immunity of federal employees involved
in state-law tort actions would be useful.”57
In response,58 Congress promptly enacted the Federal Employees Lia-
bility Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act),
which amended the FTCA to provide complete statutory immunity to fed-
eral employees from liability for common law torts arising from acts or
omissions within the scope of their federal employment.59 The Westfall Act
51. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 432 (1990).
52. Id.
53. See GAO-08-978SP, supra note 38, § 14-34 (citing White v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 639
F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d mem., 815 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1987)).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2 (1988). See also Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694 § 2(a)(3), 102 Stat. 4563
(1988); Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing absolute immunity for
federal employees acting “within the outer perimeter of their line of duty”); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
United States, 813 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (4th Cir. 1987). But see Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 769 F.2d
724, 728 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding federal officials have absolute immunity only for discretionary
conduct within scope of employment).
55. Federal Drivers Act, Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539 (1961) (providing for substitution
of the United States as a defendant under the FTCA in cases “resulting from the operation by any
employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or
employment”).
56. 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988).
57. Id.
58. H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2–4 (1988); Westfall Act, 100 Pub. L. No. 694 § 2, 102 Stat.
4563 (1988).
59. The Westfall Act provides, in part:
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does not apply to claims based on a violation of the Constitution or of a
federal statute that creates a cause of action against individuals.60 Using the
Federal Drivers Act as a model,61 it provides that if a federal employee is
sued for a covered tort for actions taken within the scope of employment,
the United States will be substituted as defendant,62 the case will proceed
under the FTCA,63 and the individual will be dismissed from the action.64
The statute’s procedures give the Department of Justice the initial re-
sponsibility for deciding whether the defendant was a federal employee act-
ing within the scope of employment at the time of the event that led to the
suit.65 If the Department of Justice concludes the employee was acting
within the scope of employment it will certify that conclusion.66 If the case
is in state court it will be removed to the federal district court where the
action was pending.67 The United States will then be substituted as defen-
dant and the employee will be dismissed from the suit.68 If the Department
of Justice refuses to certify that the employee was acting within the scope of
employment, the employee may petition the court to issue such a certifica-
tion.69 If the Department of Justice does certify that the employee was act-
ing within the scope of employment, another party may challenge that
decision in federal district court.70 In evaluating the scope of the employ-
The remedy against the United States provided by [the FTCA] for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omis-
sion gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action
or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter
against the employee or the employee’s estate is precluded without regard to when the
act or omission occurred.
100 Pub. L. No. 694 § 5, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006)).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006) states:
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the
Government—(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States, or (B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under
which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 4 (1988).
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), (5).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(4).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d); 28 C.F.R. § 15.4(a), (b) (2010).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d); 28 C.F.R. § 15.4(a), (b).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). The case cannot be remanded to state court even if the
certification of scope of employment is reversed. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 231–32
(2007) (holding “once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to adjudicate
the case resides in the federal court”).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3).
70. See Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436–37 (1995). The Department
also has authority to withdraw a certification. See 28 C.F.R. § 15.4(c).
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ment issue, the district court is not limited to the allegations of the com-
plaint71 and has discretion to allow discovery.72
II. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
There is a surprising amount of debate about whether government at-
torneys in civil litigation should temper their advocacy because they re-
present the government.73 On the criminal side, federal prosecutors clearly
have such a duty. As the Supreme Court explained seventy-five years ago:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obli-
gation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecu-
tion is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.74
Some scholars suggest that government lawyers in civil cases have a
similar obligation to “do justice,”75 “serve the public interest,”76 or “seek
justice.”77 This obligation purportedly arises because the lawyer represents
a government that has its own obligation to serve the public interest, to treat
its citizens equally, and to seek justice for all, and is himself an officer of
71. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 231 (2007) (holding that the United States would
remain as the substituted defendant “unless and until the District Court determines that the em-
ployee, in fact, and not simply as alleged by the plaintiff, engaged in conduct beyond the scope of
his employment”) (emphasis removed). The scope of employment determination applies the re-
spondeat superior law of the state in which the negligent or wrongful act occurred. See Williams
v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 857 (1955) (per curiam).
72. See, e.g., Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 827 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e recog-
nized that this burden-shifting proof scheme would sometimes make it advisable for the trial court
to permit limited discovery or conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve competing factual claims
concerning the scope-of-employment issue.”); see also JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 7,
§ 6.01(c) (providing a detailed discussion of the procedural nuances of challenges to certification
decisions).
73. The scholarship on this topic is extensive. Compare Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers,
Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 789 (2000) [hereinafter Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values] (arguing that civil gov-
ernment attorneys have greater ethical obligations than private attorneys), and Bruce A. Green,
Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235 (2000)
(same), with Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 985 (1991) (arguing
that civil government attorneys have the same ethical obligations as private attorneys).
The broader questions regarding ethical obligations of civil government attorneys are beyond the
scope of this paper which addresses one simple problem: how government attorneys might ap-
proach decisions under the FTCA.
74. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), overruled on other grounds by Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
75. See, e.g., James W. Diehm, The Government’s Duty to “Seek Justice” in Civil Cases, 9
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 289 (2000).
76. See Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values, supra note 73, at 813–16. R
77. See Green, supra note 73, at 279–80. R
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that government.78 Others respond that the idea that government attorneys
should guide their decisions by an unspecified “public interest” is “incoher-
ent,”79 or too “abstract” to have meaning.80
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) im-
pose obligations on all attorneys, including the duty to “zealously assert[ ]
the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”81 But the
rules say very little about the particular obligations of government attorneys
in civil litigation. The Preamble to the Model Rules recognizes that govern-
ment attorneys may have authority over legal matters that would normally
belong to non-governmental clients.82 Comment 9 to Model Rule 1.13, “Or-
ganization as Client,” notes the complexity of precisely identifying the cli-
ent that government attorneys represent.83 Indeed, defining the government
client has become something of a parlor game.84 Comment 9 suggests that
the client might be an agency, a branch of government, or “the government
as a whole.”85 Other possibilities include “the people,”86 “the public,”87 the
institutions of government,88 and that “sovereignty” which seeks justice.89
Advocates on both sides of the debate have used hypothetical ques-
tions involving statutes of limitations for illustrative purposes. Professor
Bruce Green discusses whether a government attorney should warn oppos-
ing counsel that she is about to miss a required filing date so that the oppo-
78. See e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government Tortfeasor:
A Study in Governmental Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 379 (2005) [hereinafter
Berenson, Hard Bargaining]; Diehm, supra note 75, at 290; Green, supra note 73, at 265–66. R
79. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Bal-
ances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1987).
80. See Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 625,
637 (1979).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope § 2 (2002).
82. Id. § 18.
83. Id. at R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (“Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a
matter beyond the scope of these Rules.”). Comment 9 on Rule 1.13 also notes that that the rule
pertaining to representing organizations applies to governmental organizations and that a govern-
ment lawyer may have more authority to question conduct than would a private attorney dealing
with a private organization. Id.
84. See Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values, supra note 73, at 797–800 (collecting
formulations of client of government attorneys).
85. Id. at 797.
86. Diehm, supra note 75, at 291.
87. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991) (listing the possibilities for the government
lawyer’s client as: “(1) the public (2) the government as a whole (3) the branch of government in
which the lawyer is employed (4) the particular agency or department in which the lawyer works
and (5) the responsible officers who make decisions for the agency”).
88. See Douglas Letter, Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask for
is a Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1993) (“In theory, federal public servants
have a single master: the people of the United States . . . [whom] they sometimes serve . . .
through loyalty not to the people directly but to institutions created by them, such as the Presi-
dency, Congress, their agency employers, or the federal courts.”).
89. Green, supra note 73, at 277.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 35 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 35 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST304.txt unknown Seq: 12 11-MAY-12 10:43
358 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
nent’s claim will not be lost.90 Professor Catherine Lanctot considers
whether a government attorney may ethically raise a statute of limitations
defense to bar the otherwise valid claim of a needy widow.91 The one ABA
ethics opinion dealing with such issues holds that a government attorney
has no greater obligation than does a private attorney to inform the oppos-
ing party that a claim asserted by her client is barred by limitations.92 The
opinion concludes that it would violate ethical obligations to make such a
disclosure without the client’s consent.93 At the moment of decision, the
question for a government lawyer faced with such a situation is not hypo-
thetical, abstract, or a matter of defining the “client.” Rather, it is the simple
but hard to answer question: How will I act in the face of this legal
problem?94
In her seminal work on the ethical obligations of federal attorneys,
Professor Catherine Lanctot argues persuasively that there is one set of
rules for all attorneys, including those who represent the government in
civil litigation.95 In the FTCA context, it is difficult to see how any other
standard would work.96 Congress has determined the circumstances for lia-
bility and the extent to which the public fisc will be put at risk, and no
money can be paid from the public treasury without its express consent.97
Congress’s decisions should not be circumvented or undermined by govern-
ment lawyers.98 It is in the public interest to protect that treasury99 and to
follow the orderly processes100 for resolving claims against the government.
90. Id. at 250–56.
91. Lanctot, supra note 73, at 951–52, 975–86. Professor Lanctot also discusses a related
limitations question: May a government attorney ethically not inform the court that its sua sponte
dismissal of an action on limitations grounds was improper for reasons that may not be perceived
by the plaintiff? Id. at 951–52, 986–94.
92. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387, at 253 (1994)
(“There is no basis in the ethics rules for holding a lawyer representing a government client to a
different standard [when disclosing to an opposing party and court that the statute of limitations
has run] than that applicable to a lawyer representing a private client.”).
93. Id. at 253–54 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, R. 1.6 (1983) (amended
2002)).
94. See Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 78, at 364.
95. Lanctot, supra note 73, at 1016–17. But see Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC,
962 F.2d 45, 46–47 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
96. See generally Diehm, supra note 75, at 293.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15.
98. See generally Lanctot, supra note 73, at 986 (noting that elected officials rather than
government lawyers have the responsibility to decide public policy); Miller, supra note 79, at
1295 (noting that “[i]f attorneys could freely sabotage the actions of their agencies out of a subjec-
tive sense of the public interest, the result would be a disorganized, inefficient bureaucracy, and a
public distrustful of its own government.”).
99. See Diehm, supra note 75, at 293.
100. See Lanctot, supra note 73, at 984–86.
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III. THE INTERSECTION OF THE FTCA & LEGAL ETHICS
A. The FTCA & Plaintiffs
In the typical FTCA case, a person who believes she was injured by
government negligence will comply with the FTCA’s mandatory adminis-
trative claim requirement by filing with the agency involved a written claim
that states what happened and a sum certain.101 The agency can then settle
the claim or deny it.102 In assessing the claim, the agency will consider its
factual and legal merits, including any applicable defenses. If a proposed
settlement is for an amount larger than the agency’s authority, the agency
must secure approval from the Department of Justice.103 The majority of
FTCA administrative claims are resolved on the administrative level and do
not go to litigation.104
The claimant can file suit if the claim is denied or if a settlement is not
reached and six months have passed since the claim was filed.105 If the
claimant files a complaint, the case will proceed like any other lawsuit. If
the case is not settled or dismissed, it will go to trial before a United States
district judge acting as the fact-finder.106 The role and ethical obligations of
the Justice Department attorney responsible for defending the case would
be like that of any defense attorney in a similar suit.
Many defenses could keep a case from being decided on its factual
merits. First, the FTCA contains two statutes of limitations. A written ad-
ministrative claim must be presented to the responsible agency within two
years of the claim’s accrual.107 If the agency denies that claim, suit must be
filed in federal district court within six months of the date of that denial.108
A suit must comply with both limitations periods or it will be barred.109
Second, Congress wrote into the text of the FTCA explicit exceptions
to the waiver of sovereign immunity.110 If any of them apply, the suit is
barred, and the case will not be decided on its factual merits. For example,
suppose the child of U.S. diplomats alleges that while visiting her parents
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006).
102. Id. § 2672.
103. Id.
104. See 3 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 7, § 17.01; Jeffrey Axelrad, Federal Tort
Claims Act Administrative Claims: Better Than Third-Party ADR for Resolving Federal Tort
Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1331, 1342–45 (2000) (arguing that the administrative claim system is
efficient because it enables many claims to be settled before reaching court).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
106. Id. § 2402.
107. Id. § 2401(b).
108. Id.
109. Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 608 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a suit is barred by
six month limitations period even though suit was filed less than two years after the auto acci-
dent). See generally McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). State statutes of limitation
have no application under the FTCA. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 184 F.2d 587, 588–89
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
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she contracted a horrible disease because a negligent State Department doc-
tor placed her entire family in the quarantine wing of the American Em-
bassy with people who had the disease. Regardless of the truth of her
allegations, at least three exceptions to the FTCA—the quarantine excep-
tion,111 the false imprisonment exception,112 and the foreign tort excep-
tion113—would bar her suit, and her allegations would not be the subject of
a trial.
Third, any suit must also fall within the jurisdictional limits of the
FTCA that are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).114 As the Supreme Court
explained in FDIC v. Meyer115:
Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over
a certain category of claims for which the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity and “render[ed]” itself liable. This
category includes claims that are:
“[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . .
[3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
[4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government [5] while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, [6] under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.”
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—and thus is “cog-
nizable” under §1346(b)—if it is actionable under § 1346(b). And
a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six elements
outlined above.116
Because the FTCA applies the substantive tort law of the place of the alleg-
edly wrongful act or omission, any state law defenses available to private
defendants would be available to the government.117 These include, inter
alia, contributory negligence,118 comparative negligence,119 assumption of
111. Id. § 2680(f).
112. Id. § 2680(h).
113. Id. § 2680(k).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) states:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred.
115. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
116. Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
118. See, e.g., Kahn v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding contribu-
tory negligence where plaintiff stepped into Kennedy Center elevator car that was two feet lower
than the floor).
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risk,120 superseding cause,121 the absence of an actionable duty,122 recrea-
tional use statutes,123 and the statutory employer doctrine.124
Additional defenses may apply. If Congress did not intend for a suit to
fall within the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, it is barred. For ex-
ample, in Jefferson v. United States,125 a military surgeon left a towel mea-
suring thirty inches by eighteen inches in the body cavity of an active duty
soldier.126 Because the Supreme Court determined that Congress had not
waived sovereign immunity for claims that arise incident to military ser-
vice, it held in Feres v. United States127 that the suit was barred.128 Like-
wise, some statutes bar tort liability for certain kinds of claims. For
example, the Federal Employees Compensation Act bars suit when its
workers compensation type remedy may be available,129 and the Flood
Control Act of 1928 bars suits arising from “floods or flood waters . . . .”130
From the perspective of a plaintiff who successfully avoids these barri-
ers and for whom the FTCA provides a remedy, the government is the very
best sort of deep pocket defendant. The United States will pay all compen-
satory damages awarded against it.131 For an unsuccessful plaintiff whose
119. See, e.g., Murff v. United States, 785 F.2d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1986) (barring suit where
airplane pilot’s negligence exceeded that of air traffic controllers; “The Texas form of compara-
tive negligence permits no recovery against one who is less negligent than the plaintiff.”).
120. See, e.g., Clem v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 835, 845 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (applying Indi-
ana “incurred risk doctrine” where swimmer entered unfamiliar waters after being informed no
lifeguard was present and the waters were hazardous).
121. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 962, 971 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(allowing no recovery because superseding negligence of airplane pilot caused crash).
122. See, e.g., Walters v. United States, 474 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding no
FTCA liability for accident caused by loose gravel on roadway because a private party would have
no duty to prevent such a condition).
123. See, e.g., Matheny v. United States, 469 F.3d 1093 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that Indiana
Recreational Use Statute foreclosed recovery where woman was injured by a protruding pipe
while sledding in a national park).
124. See, e.g., Leigh v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 860 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine protected the United States from liability
for injuries employee of a subcontractor sustained while testing the external tank of the space
shuttle).
125. 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
126. Id. at 519.
127. 340 U.S. at 146.
128. Id. See generally Paul F. Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2010) (examining the early influences on the FTCA and arguing that the
Supreme Court correctly held that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to encompass injuries to
service members).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2006).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006), which provides, in part, “The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages.”
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otherwise meritorious claim is barred, a private relief bill is the only
remedy.132
B. The FTCA & Government Employees
The FTCA is particularly important to a federal employee accused of a
tort because, if the employee was acting within the scope of employment,
the Act grants her complete immunity from common law tort liability re-
gardless of whether it allows any recovery to the plaintiff.133 Under the
FTCA’s procedures, the Department of Justice, with input from the em-
ployee’s agency, will decide whether the employee was acting within the
scope of employment.134 If so, the Department of Justice will certify that
conclusion.135 The United States will be substituted as defendant, and the
employee will be dismissed from the suit.136
This decision about scope of employment obviously has serious conse-
quences for the individuals involved. If the United States is substituted as
defendant and FTCA defenses apply, the plaintiff will have no recovery.137
If the defendant-employee is not certified, she may be left to defend the
litigation and pay any judgment on her own.
Scope of employment determinations for FTCA purposes turn on state
respondeat superior law.138 If a federal employee has a motor vehicle acci-
dent under circumstances where a private person would be outside the
scope of employment under state law, the FTCA and its immunity for fed-
eral employees would not apply.139 For instance, state law on the going-
and-coming rule will determine whether commuting federal employees
were acting within the scope of employment and protected by the FTCA.140
132. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (holding that the FTCA renders
federal employee tortfeasors immune from suit even when the FTCA defenses bar recovery).
133. See generally id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2006) (providing that employees acting
within the scope of employment shall be substituted by the United States as the defendant).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c); 28 C.F.R. §§ 15.1–4 (2011).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c); 28 C.F.R. §§ 15.1–4.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).
137. See Smith, 499 U.S. at 166–67.
138. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 857 (1955) (per curiam) (“This case is con-
trolled by the California doctrine of respondeat superior.”), vacating 215 F.2d 800, 808 (9th Cir.
1954) (affirming dismissal because negligent acts of a soldier while off duty and off base were
outside military line of duty).
139. See, e.g., Mider v. United States, 322 F.2d 193, 197–98 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding two
soldiers were outside the scope of their employment when “[t]hey took the government vehicle to
go to Abner’s home for an entirely personal weekend frolic, and became intoxicated on the way,
and, before the collision which occurred fifty-five miles from the Base”).
140. Compare Clamor v. United States, 240 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Navy civilian employee who had auto accident in government rented vehicle while leaving work
for the day was not acting within the scope of his employment under Hawaii law), with Healy ex
rel. Healy v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 157, 163–64 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that FBI agent
driving from home to work was within scope of employment under D.C. law because his use of
FBI car served the agency’s needs).
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Programs that allow law enforcement officers to drive agency vehicles
during non-work hours are a prime breeding ground for disputes about
scope of employment.141 Interesting problems arise when male law enforce-
ment officers have female guests in their cars. If the officer is posing as a
gangster and has an accident after leaving a tavern at two o’clock a.m., he
may well be within the scope of employment if the lady accompanying him
has gang connections. If the same officer has an accident during regular
business hours in an airport parking lot, he is likely outside the scope of
employment if the lady is his mother who just flew in from Chicago.142
Questions regarding scope of employment determinations can lead to
tension among the accused tortfeasor-employee who wants immunity, the
employee’s agency, which may want to protect him, and the Department of
Justice, which is responsible for independently administering this aspect of
the FTCA. A federal employee facing substantial personal liability has a
strong interest in receiving a favorable scope of employment determination.
If the employee is not a lawyer he may not understand the nuances of state
respondeat superior law or why those nuances control such an important
decision in his life. He or his union may press his agency to advocate for his
position. The agency has an interest in its employees’ morale and their per-
ception of its willingness to protect them. If the employee is high-ranking,
the agency may have political reasons to support his position. The Depart-
ment of Justice is largely immune from such pressures. It is charged with
applying the law to the facts.
Similar problems can arise in deciding whether an accused tortfeasor is
a federal employee for FTCA purposes. The Act defines “[e]mployee of the
government” to include:
officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the mili-
tary or naval forces of the United States, members of the National
Guard while engaged in training or duty . . . , and persons acting
on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily
or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with
or without compensation.143
Determining employee status is critical because the FTCA does not apply if
the tortfeasor is not a federal employee.144 The answer in any particular
case may be complicated, but generally turns on whether a common law
master-servant relationship exists with the federal government.145 State or
141. See, e.g., W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Corp. v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 295, 297–98 (D. Minn.
1997) (holding that a Minneapolis police officer, a Special Deputy U.S. Marshall on sick leave,
was not within scope of employment while using an FBI car to pick up daughter from day care).
142. See id. at 297.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
144. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S.
521, 526 (1973) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
145. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 7, § 8.04 n.14 (“A servant is a person employed
to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the
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local law enforcement officers deputized as federal officers may be federal
employees for FTCA purposes and entitled to its statutory immunity for
common law torts.146 Other defendant-tortfeasors who do not squarely fit
the “[e]mployee of the government” definition, including informants,147 in-
spectors,148 jurors,149 and private agencies,150 have also sought to be treated
as federal employees for FTCA purposes.151
Because the FTCA grants federal employees immunity and provides
plaintiffs a deep-pocket defendant, tortfeasors and plaintiffs may have a
common interest in having a defendant deemed a federal employee. This
may have been the case in Brandes v. United States,152 where the fiance´ of
a Veterans’ Administration doctor had a traffic accident while driving a
government vehicle on a house-hunting trip with the doctor in a new city.153
The district court held the fiance´ to be a federal employee, although the
Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated that decision.154
performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right of control.”) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d § 220(1) (1958)).
146. See, e.g., Provancial v. United States, 454 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that city
police officers with special commission to arrest Indians within Indian Reservation were federal
employees for FTCA purposes); Chin v. Wilhelm, 291 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (D. Md. 2003) (hold-
ing Baltimore City Police officers assigned to DEA Task Force were federal employees for FTCA
purposes), aff’d, No. 06-1428, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32075, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2006).
147. Wang v. United States, 947 F.2d 1400, 1401 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding case for determi-
nation whether Internal Revenue Service informant should be certified as a federal employee for
FTCA purposes). Compare Leaf v. United States, 661 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
DEA informant who rented an airplane for use in an undercover operation was a FTCA federal
employee), with Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding DEA
informant involved in shooting was not a FTCA federal employee).
148. Compare Haddix v. Yetter Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 915, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding
Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspector was not a federal employee), with In re
Air Crash Disaster near Silver Plume, 445 F. Supp. 384, 400 (D. Kan. 1977) (holding FAA in-
spector was a federal employee).
149. Sellers v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D. Idaho 1987) (holding prospective
juror driving to courthouse was not a federal employee).
150. Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing an indus-
try anti-fraud organization, the National Insurance Crime Bureau, which sought to be certified as
federal employee for FTCA purposes).
151. There is a significant question whether a corporation can be deemed to be a federal
employee for FTCA purposes. Compare Adams v. United States, 420 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that helicopter company retained to spread herbicide could not be certified as a
federal employee because “the word ‘persons’ as used in this portion of the FTCA does not in-
clude corporations”), and Vallier v. Jet Propulsion Lab., 120 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (rejecting request by university engaged in rocket research that it be certified as federal
employee for FTCA purposes), aff’d, 23 F. App’x 803 (9th Cir. 2001), with B&A Marine Co. v.
Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the American For-
eign Shipping Company (AFS) was a federal employee because, inter alia, its contract with the
Maritime Administration “expressly provided that AFS would serve ‘as [the Maritime Administra-
tion’s] agent, and not as an independent contractor’”).
152. 783 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’g 569 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
153. Id. at 895–96.
154. Id. at 897.
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Disputes about “employee” status can be very important to accused
tortfeasors, the agencies to which they are connected, and injured plaintiffs.
For example, in the 1980s, Department of Energy contractors involved in
the nation’s nuclear weapons program were sued in over fifty cases by
thousands of plaintiffs allegedly injured by radiation,155 including test site
workers, members of the military, and downwinders.156 The contractors
were not at financial risk because their contracts included valid indemnity
agreements that made the United States an indemnitor for all tort liability
and costs of litigation.157 Nonetheless, for several years they sought to be
considered part of the government for actions they took to assist in the
nuclear weapons program.158
Having failed to convince the Department of Justice to support that
position in court, the contractors argued to Congress that, despite indemnifi-
cation, pending litigation interfered with their research and unfairly opened
them to blame.159 They threatened to end their participation in nuclear re-
search and expressed concern that the litigation might undermine the nu-
clear weapons program.160 Consequently, in 1984 Congress enacted a
statute that made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for injuries “due to expo-
sure to radiation based on acts or omissions by a contractor in carrying out
an atomic weapons testing program under a contract with the United
States”161 and required the United States to substitute itself in place of the
contractors under FTCA-like procedures.162 Because FTCA defenses ap-
plied to the allegations made against the nuclear weapons contractors, the
legislation effectively ended the plaintiffs’ hope for recovery.163
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-124, pt. 4, at 2 (1983).
156. See id. at 2–3; see, e.g., In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 (9th
Cir. 1987) (military personnel); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (test site
worker).
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-124, pt. 4, at 11, app. 2 (Modification No. M203 Contract No. W-
7405-ENG-36, Clause 16—Contingencies—litigation and claims); S. REP. NO. 98-500, at 375–77
(1984); see, e.g., In re Consol. U.S., 820 F.2d at 987; Hammond, 786 F.2d at 13–14.
158. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-124, pt. 4, at 1–4.
159. See id. at 2.
160. See id. at 3.
161. 50 U.S.C. § 2783(b)(1) (2006) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 2212(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2003)).
162. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 2783(c), with 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).
163. See, e.g., In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 986–92 (9th Cir.
1987) (approving substitution, upholding constitutionality of the substitution, and dismissing
claims under affirmative FTCA defenses); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d at 8, 10–16 (1st
Cir. 1986) (same).
Legislation that extends FTCA coverage to contractors is troublesome because it blurs the
distinction between contractors on the one hand, and federal agencies or instrumentalities on the
other, a distinction that protects the United States from liability for the acts of its contractors. See
H.R. REP. NO. 98-124, pt. 4, at 4.
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C. The FTCA & Federal Agencies
The government is not a monolith,164 and federal agencies may have
interests that conflict with a strict adherence to the limits of the FTCA.
These interests may be political, budgetary, or programmatic. They may put
the agency at odds with the Department of Justice regarding how the FTCA
should apply in particular circumstances. The Judgment Fund and its proce-
dures are important to any discussion of such disputes and the ethical issues
they raise.
It is easy to be generous, or less careful, with other people’s money.165
This truism has consequences in the FTCA context. Because any FTCA
judgment or any FTCA settlement in excess of $2500 will be paid from the
Judgment Fund rather than agency appropriations, agencies have little fi-
nancial interest in the outcome of an FTCA claim or suit.166 Because
agency funds are not at risk under the FTCA, agencies lack a key incentive
to oppose claims, especially when the agency has some reason to prefer that
the FTCA apply. Thus, agency officials may urge against the weight of
evidence that an employee was acting within the scope of employment out
of concern for the employee or for political reasons internal to the agency.
Agencies or agency officials may also have cause to seek a disproportion-
ally generous financial award in favor of a claimant, either because that
claimant seems particularly sympathetic or because such an award would
further the agency’s policy interests. On occasion, agencies have proposed
non-meritorious FTCA settlements in order to avoid disclosure of malfea-
sance, ineptness, or embarrassing facts.
An agency contractually obligated to use its appropriations to indem-
nify its contractor can save those appropriated funds if the contractor is
treated as a government employee under the FTCA because any payment
will come from the Judgment Fund if the suit is settled or lost.167 Accord-
ingly, an agency may perceive that its ability to conduct its programs will
be enhanced if the FTCA can be used to shield the agency’s contractors
from liability. This is so although, generally speaking, the government is
not liable under the FTCA for the torts of government contractors,168 and
164. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982).
165. Cf. In re Erewhon, Inc., 21 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (“When dealing with
other people’s money, there is apt to be less regard for exercising the same scrutiny of charges that
one might render when dealing purely with one’s own expenses.”).
166. Federal agencies do bear the cost of providing litigation support, witnesses, and in-house
counsel to assist the Department of Justice attorneys that represent the government in court. See
Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine: Here Today—Gone To-
morrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 15 (1990).
167. See discussions of nuclear weapons contractors, supra notes 155–63 and accompanying
text, and tribal contractors, infra note 172.
168. The FTCA defines the term “Federal agency” as including “the executive departments,
the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the
United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United
States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006)
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the Antideficiency Act169 bars government officers from agreeing to indem-
nify contractors unless the agency has funds available for that purpose or
special statutory authority to indemnify.170
The freedom from direct financial consequences to the agency may
lead agency officials to provide only minimal support to the defense of a
case or to ignore it entirely. This problem arises most frequently when the
plaintiff has a prior relationship with the officials, when all the agency per-
sonnel with knowledge of an event have left the concerned facility, or when
the entity involved does not perceive itself to be part of the federal govern-
ment, such as when the tortfeasor is a nuclear weapons contractor171 or
tribal employee or tribal contractor172 for whose torts Congress has ac-
(emphasis added). In Logue v. United States, the Court recognized “the Act’s exclusion of em-
ployees of a ‘contractor with the United States.’” 412 U.S. 521, 523, 532 (1973) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671). The Court held, where a federal prisoner committed suicide while housed in a county jail,
that the United States is not liable under the FTCA for torts of a contractor when the government
does not control the detailed physical aspects of the contractor’s operation. Id. at 531–32; see also
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 819 (1976) (holding community service agency was not a
federal agency even though it received federal funding and complied with federal regulations).
169. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). The Antideficiency Act prohibits any government officer from
entering a “contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made
unless authorized by law.” Id.
170. One consequence of the Antideficiency Act is that, absent available funds or special
statutory authority, agencies cannot agree to indemnify government contractors and contractors
cannot recover on indemnification agreements that violate the statute. See, e.g., Cal.-Pac. Utils.
Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 703, 715 (1971) (holding power company could not recover
indemnity for money paid to soldier injured by its electrical line because the Antideficiency Act
“proscribes indemnification on the grounds that it would constitute the obligation of funds not yet
appropriated”) (citations omitted); see Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 427–28
(1996); see also 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-60 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GAO-06-382SP], available at http://www.
gao.gov/special.pubs/d06382sp.pdf.
The Department of Energy and its predecessors had statutory authority to enter indemnity
contracts under 50 U.S.C. § 1431. This statutory authority originated in the First War Powers Act.
Act of Dec. 17, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 201, 55 Stat. 838, 839 (1941). Indeed, in 1943, the
General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) approved an indemnity
agreement that protected contractors involved in the Manhattan Project. See GAO-06-382SP,
supra, at 6-78 n.82 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-33801, REQUEST FOR RULING
ON PROPRIETY OF CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS (1943), available at http://archive.gao.gov/lglp2pdf
23/087300.pdf)).
171. See discussions of nuclear weapons contractors, supra notes 155–63.
172. Congress made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for torts of tribal employees and contrac-
tors acting under certain contracts or agreements, giving them the FTCA’s “full protection and
coverage.” Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, Title III, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959 (1990)
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 450(f) (2006)). The pertinent contracts and agreements are those
authorized “by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, as amended,
and . . . [the] Tribally Controlled School Grants of the Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secon-
dary School Improvement Amendments of 1988, as amended.” Id. (citations omitted). Accord-
ingly, any settlements or judgments arising from the covered torts of those tribal employees and
contractors are paid from the Judgment Fund. Id. at 1960. The statute does require the Secretary of
Interior to request funds with which to reimburse the Treasury for the prior year’s payments. Id.
But see Mentz v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 2d 856, 861–62 (D.N.D. 2005) (holding that tribal
school superintendent and agency education administrator provided evidence refuting claim of
auto mechanics teacher that he was authorized to work on private vehicles on school grounds).
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cepted FTCA liability. The lack of agency financial consequences may also
embolden individuals within the agency to become advocates for the plain-
tiffs. This advocacy may be grounded in guilt feelings of an employee who
caused an injury, anger at the agency for old grievances or actions related to
the injury, or strong disagreement with the government’s failure to provide
compensation to the plaintiffs.
A prime example is the course followed by Secretary of Energy Hazel
O’Leary immediately before and during the Prescott trial. The Prescott liti-
gation173 was a massive radiation case, consolidating fifteen lawsuits in-
volving 216 former Nevada Test Site workers or their families.174 The
plaintiffs alleged in eight counts that, between January 1951 and February
1981, the negligence of the Department of Energy (and its predecessor or-
ganizations175), the Department of Defense, and their nuclear weapons con-
tractors led to the occupational exposure of the workers to ionizing
radiation, causing them to contract various diseases.176 The trial of six rep-
resentative cancer cases, Mr. Prescott’s, and five wrongful death actions,
took place in Las Vegas from December 13, 1993, until February 1,
1994.177
Less than a week before the trial began, Secretary O’Leary gave a
speech in which she announced a new Department of Energy (DOE) policy
of openness, noted her concern for victims of previously disclosed human
experimentation, and expressed hope that, with disclosures about radiation
at DOE’s work sites, “we can improve the work conditions and the safety of
our employees who work there, and that we already know is one of our
major vulnerabilities.”178 The speech and the related press materials179 re-
ceived broad coverage under headlines such as “U.S. Reveals 204 Nuclear
Tests, Plutonium Exposure, Weapons: Energy Department Declassifies
Cold War Data. Radioactive Matter Was Injected into 18 People,”180 and
173. Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Nev. 1994).
174. Id. at 1464.
175. Id. at 1467 (noting that the Department of Energy’s predecessor organizations in the
nuclear weapons program included the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and
Development Administration).
176. Id. at 1464–65.
177. Id. at 1464.
178. Hazel O’Leary, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Openess (Dec. 7, 1993) (transcript available at
http://gos.sbc.edu/o/oleary.html). Her next sentence stated, “So the more we know, the more we
share, the better we are in a position to do that.” Id.
179. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Secretary Unveils Openness Initiative
(Dec. 7, 1993), available at https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms.jsp?formurl=reports/pc931207.
html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Openness Press Conference Fact Sheets (Dec. 7,
1993), available at https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms.jsp?formurl=reports/pc931207.html.
180. Issa Healy, U.S. Reveals 204 Nuclear Tests, Plutonium Exposure, Weapons: Energy De-
partment Declassifies Cold War Data. Radioactive Matter Was Injected into 18 People, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at A1 (“‘We’ve got to expose the impact of the Cold War, both in terms of
its environmental health and safety impacts and also impacts on . . . the psyche of the nation,’
O’Leary told reporters. ‘One of the benefits to openness will be to build public trust.’”).
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“204 Secret Nuclear Tests by U.S. Are Made Public.”181 On December 28,
1993, Secretary O’Leary gave an interview on CNN and held another press
conference in which she called for the government to compensate people
who had been exposed to radiation as subjects of medical testing or from
fallout downwind from the Nevada Test Site.182 The flurry of publicity ob-
viously was of interest to the participants in Prescott. In a news story pub-
lished the next day, Stuart Udall, one of the attorneys representing the
Prescott plaintiffs, interpreted the Secretary’s statements as “a very bold
step” and an apology.183 Secretary O’Leary acknowledged that her com-
ments were in conflict with the views of the Department of Justice184 and
that they might make the government more vulnerable in litigation.185
Some of Secretary O’Leary’s remarks seem intended to undermine the
government’s defense of the Prescott litigation. In discussing the subjects
of medical testing, Secretary O’Leary pointedly identified by name as per-
sons who had engaged in human experimentation three scientists listed by
the Department of Justice as expert witnesses in Prescott.186 The Prescott
plaintiffs sought to capitalize on the perceived ethical vulnerability of these
scientists.187 Incongruously, Secretary O’Leary did not include Dr. Karl
Morgan in her list of persons who had engaged in human experimenta-
tion.188 Dr. Morgan had already testified as an expert for the Prescott plain-
tiffs about Nevada Test Site safety issues.189 His cross-examination showed
181. John H. Cushman, Jr., 204 Secret Nuclear Tests by U.S. Are Made Public, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1993, at A20 (“‘We were shrouded and clouded in an atmosphere of secrecy,’ Energy
Secretary Hazel R. O’Leary said at a news conference, where the new details were disclosed.
‘And I would take it a step further: I would call it repression.’”); accord Tom Squitieri, U.S. Hid
200 Nuclear Tests Since ‘40s, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at A4 (“‘The Cold War is over,’
O’Leary said. ‘We’re coming clean.’”).
182. See Keith Schneider, Energy Official Seeks to Assist Victims of Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1993, at A1.
183. Id. (quoting Stuart Udall, and identifying him as a former Secretary of the Interior). Ten
days later, Mr. Udall, encouraged by Secretary O’Leary’s comments, expressed plans to travel to
Washington to engage in settlement discussions. See Michael Janofsky, Radiation Victim Hopes
for Redress: Revelation of Atom Experiments on Humans, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Jan. 1, 1994, at
U1.
184. See Schneider, supra note 182, at A1 (“‘I cannot imagine there would be any other
posture that I could take on this . . . . I am also clear on the fact that the Justice Department may
come from another position and point of view.’”) (quoting Energy Sec’y Hazel R. O’Leary).
185. Id. (recognizing potential for lawsuits).
186. Id.
187. The Prescott plaintiffs successfully moved for an order requiring government attorneys
to give two days notice before calling any expert witness who had participated in human experi-
mentation. See Warren Bates, Judge: U.S. Must Report Radiation Witnesses, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Jan. 12, 1994, at 3a.
188. See id.
189. See Warren Bates, Doctor Aiding Radiation Victims Admits Advocating Past Testing,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 16, 1993, at 6b.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 41 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 41 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST304.txt unknown Seq: 24 11-MAY-12 10:43
370 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
that he previously advocated for and engaged in exposing humans to radia-
tion for scientific purposes.190
Regardless of O’Leary’s comments, the Prescott trial ended in a com-
plete victory for the government. The court held that plaintiffs’ claims
lacked legal and factual merit. First, the FTCA’s discretionary function ex-
ception barred the claims because they arose from policy choices grounded
in social, economic, or political policy, made by responsible officials acting
under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act.191 Second, the plaintiffs had
not shown a breach of the standard of care.192 Third, the plaintiffs had not
shown causation, that their exposures to ionizing radiation at the test site
were “a substantially contributing factor in causing” their cancers.193 The
plaintiffs did not appeal.
IV. A SUGGESTED ETHICAL APPROACH FOR GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
HANDLING FTCA MATTERS
The debate about whether civil government attorneys have enhanced
ethical obligations raises questions for those who administer the FTCA:
Should a government attorney defeat an otherwise valid claim
through the use of the exclusions or exceptions of the FTCA, stat-
utes of limitations, Feres, or state law defenses?
Should a government attorney put a finger on the scale of a scope
of employment determination to give an injured plaintiff a chance
at recovery or to protect a well-regarded federal employee?
Should the handling of litigation or the consideration of settle-
ment be altered because of agency policies, preferences, or pro-
grams; adverse publicity about the facts giving rise to a claim; or
embarrassment about the manner in which the claim was
processed?
How should attorneys responsible for administering and defending
FTCA cases approach specific ethical problems? The search for an identifi-
able governmental client, difficult in general, is virtually impossible here.
190. See id. On cross-examination Dr. Morgan acknowledged that in 1955 he had suggested
prisoners might agree to be used in radiation tests as restitution for their crimes, and that in 1943
he had taped radioactive discs to the arms and breasts of women. Id.; see Karl Z. Morgan,
Problems Associated with the Application of External and Internal Radiation Exposure Limits, 16
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N Q. 307, 314 (1955) (urging that “every effort should be made to
obtain autopsy data” when cooperating prisoners expire).
191. Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461, 1466–71 (D. Nev. 1994).
192. Id. at 1472–73. Judge Pro concluded that it was inappropriate to judge radiological safety
decisions made forty years earlier by present day scientific and medical standards, but that under
the standards of the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s the result would be the same. Id. at 1472. He did not
address the side issue of experts conducting human experimentation. Indeed, the only such expert
mentioned in the opinion was plaintiff’s Dr. Morgan who “stated that his evaluation of NTS safety
practices was based upon the standards adhered to today, and that his own conduct with regard to
radiation experimentation in the early 1940s, should not be judged by today’s standards.” Id.
193. Id. at 1473–79.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 42 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 42 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST304.txt unknown Seq: 25 11-MAY-12 10:43
2011] ETHICAL INTERSECTIONS & THE FTCA 371
The interests of plaintiffs, government employee-tortfeasors, and federal
agencies are all in play, often against one another.
Any approach to ethical decision-making in the FTCA context must be
consistent with the Constitution and Congress’s intent for the Act. Two
constitutional principles apply: First, the Constitution provides that no
money can be paid from the public fisc except as Congress has directed.194
Second, our system of justice requires the uniform application of the law to
all persons.195
Congress enacted the FTCA to provide injured parties an “effective
and readily available remedy”196 for those claims that fall within the Act’s
waiver of sovereign immunity. It sought to end the inefficient, burdensome,
and unjust system of resolving tort claims through legislative private relief
bills, and to create a system that provided compensation to individuals in-
jured by government negligence without damaging the efficient operation
of government or unduly taxing the public treasury.197 Unlike the typical
defendant, Congress affirmatively wanted tort claims against the govern-
ment to be adjudicated and paid, so long as they fell within the authorized
categories.198
The ethical course for government attorneys handling FTCA matters, I
suggest, is to affirmatively assist every claim to successfully make its way
into the FTCA’s adjudicatory system and, then, in every case to vigorously
raise each defense that is reasonably supported by the facts and the law.
Both steps are necessary to fulfill Congress’s purposes.
Government attorneys should affirmatively reach out to help any
claimant having difficulty complying with the Act’s administrative or pro-
cedural requirements. In practice, this means government attorneys negoti-
ating with claimants should advise them of approaching deadlines that, if
missed, would bar their claims. For example, government attorneys should
inform such claimants if they have not yet filed a written claim and the two
year limitations period is about to run, if they have not included a sum
194. See discussion supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
195. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (emphasizing
that refusal to recognize a class as quasi-suspect for constitutional review does not leave the class
unprotected because it still retains the right to equal treatment under the laws); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”), overruled on other grounds, Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); see also Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547
U.S. 651, 669 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (interpreting the bankruptcy code priorities in
accord with the principle of “equal treatment of like claims”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
351 (1921) (Pitney, J., dissenting) (“The guaranty of ‘equal protection’ entitles plaintiffs to treat-
ment not less favorable than that given to others similarly circumstanced.”); cf. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”).
196. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 40.
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See discussion supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
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certain in that claim, or if the six month limitations period is approaching.
While these actions may result in judgments against the government that
might otherwise have been avoided, they plainly meet Congress’s goal of
having claims decided under the FTCA regime.199 For many years, such
steps were the practice in the Civil Division’s Torts Branch. The alternative,
for government attorneys to mislead or watch in silence as a claimant’s
inaction defeats its claim, is contrary to the underlying purposes of the
FTCA.200
Every claim or suit should be treated in the same manner.201 The only
approach that can consistently be applied to all claims is to raise every
reasonable defense every time, including statutes of limitations and all the
FTCA’s exceptions and exclusions. Pulling punches for favored claimants
or pulling out more stops against the politically unpopular is inconsistent
with the rule of law.202 Government lawyers would usurp Congress’s pre-
rogative over the government’s purse if they ignored the limits Congress
placed on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.203
In practice, this means that government attorneys should simply apply
the law to the facts at hand. If the law bars the claim of a particularly
sympathetic plaintiff, so be it. Decisions on scope of employment and fed-
eral employee status should be made without regard to agency preferences
or the financial consequences for plaintiffs, government-employee defend-
ants, or the federal treasury.204 While the views of an agency about the law,
the facts, and the litigative risk should be carefully considered, decisions
about whether to settle or defend litigation should not be altered by political
199. See generally Van Fossen v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(noting “the intent behind the [administrative claim requirement] is to ease court congestion and
speed the decision-making process through the settlement of meritorious claims prior to trial. This
‘more expeditious procedure’ is meant to benefit claimants and in no way is designed to preclude
them from their day in court.”).
200. See discussion supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Patricia M. Wald, “For the United States”: Government Lawyers in Court,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 124–27 (1998).
202. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (emphasizing
that refusal to recognize a class as quasi-suspect for constitutional review does not leave the class
unprotected because it still retains the right to equal treatment under the laws). See also Howard
Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 669 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the bankruptcy code priorities in accord with the principle of “equal treatment of like
claims”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 351 (1921) (Pitney, J., dissenting) (“The guaranty of
‘equal protection’ entitles plaintiffs to treatment not less favorable than that given to others simi-
larly circumstanced.”); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
203. See Lanctot, supra note 73, at 984 (“To do otherwise would be to expend funds that
Congress has already determined should not be spent.”).
204. See Miller, supra note 79, at 1296 (noting that government attorneys act in the context of
their role in one branch of the government).
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considerations,205 agency policy concerns, or the risk of bad publicity.206
Certainly, lobbying in favor of particular plaintiffs by agency employees or
officials should not alter litigation decisions.
A brief review of the alternative demonstrates its fallacy. Department
of Justice attorneys cannot in good conscience ignore the FTCA’s foreign
tort exception because they like the plaintiff.207 Nor can government attor-
neys properly use Judgment Fund money to settle a readily defensible,
multi-million dollar case because agency officials think it would be good
policy, good politics, or simply wise to do so.208 When Congress enacted
the FTCA, it limited the Act’s scope by including legal defenses to protect
government operations and the public fisc.209 When it created the Judgment
Fund’s shortcut around the appropriations process, it trusted government
attorneys to apply the laws scrupulously.210 Congress, not government at-
torneys or agency officials, has the authority and responsibility to decide
when FTCA defenses should be waived and when politics, policy, or wis-
dom justifies the payment of taxpayer money to plaintiffs who could not
recover under the FTCA.211
The proposed two-step ethical approach for FTCA issues arguably
meets the standards set by both sides of the debate on the ethical obligations
of civil government attorneys. Government attorneys who help claimants
enter the FTCA’s adjudicatory system follow the path urged by those who
believe government attorneys in civil cases take on the government’s own
obligation to serve the public interest.212 If the ethical obligations of civil
government attorneys are identical to those of private attorneys, the same
course of action is mandated. Any attorney who represents a client that
wants to establish an administrative system to organize numerous claims
raised against it and to resolve administratively those claims that can be
settled without litigation would help claimants file claims in that system.213
205. Congress has the authority and responsibility to make such decisions, as it did in passing
the Westfall Act and in providing FTCA protection to nuclear weapons contractors and tribal
contractors. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 59, 159–63, 171–72.
206. See generally Diehm, supra note 75, at 290 (noting tension between representing govern-
ment in litigation and simultaneously furthering a political agenda).
207. See Miller, supra note 79, at 1295 (noting that government attorneys lack authority to
substitute their views for judgments made by governmental processes).
208. See Green, supra note 73, at 278 (noting that government lawyers abdicate their responsi- R
bility if they defer to agency officials who lack authority over litigation).
209. See discussion supra Part III.A.
210. See discussion supra notes 49–53. R
211. See Lanctot, supra note 73, at 984 (noting that the executive branch has a constitutional
duty to enforce limits established by Congress). If a claimant cannot recover under the FTCA she
may seek enactment of a private relief bill. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
212. See generally Green, supra note 73, at 250–55. R
213. British Petroleum created such a system to deal with claims arising from the 2010 oil
spill. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011); Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
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The second part of the proposed approach, calling on government at-
torneys to raise every reasonably supported defense to every FTCA claim,
also seems to be in harmony with both sides of the ethical debate. If civil
government attorneys have the same ethical obligation to provide zealous
representation as private attorneys, they have a duty to raise every reasona-
ble defense in every case.214 Such vigorous advocacy is also appropriate if
government attorneys have a different ethical standard, that of serving jus-
tice or the public interest. Supporters of the public interest ethical standard
disavow that “public interest” is to be subjectively defined by the govern-
ment lawyer’s personal preferences or world-view.215 Rather, the public in-
terest standard means that government attorneys have the same public
interest obligations as the government they serve.216 In the FTCA context,
where Congress has weighed the need for compensation and placed specific
limits on its waiver of sovereign immunity, the public interest is served
when government attorneys vigorously raise the defenses Congress estab-
lished to protect the public treasury and the processes of government.217
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the FTCA to create an effective and equitable sys-
tem to decide and pay certain claims arising from torts of federal employ-
ees,218 but limited the Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity with a
broad range of defenses. To serve Congress’s purposes and their own ethi-
cal obligations, government attorneys should affirmatively foster the
FTCA’s administrative process by helping plaintiffs comply with the Act’s
procedural requirements, and then treat each claim equally by vigorously
raising every reasonable defense in every case.
Protocol for Interim and Final Claims (2011), available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.
com/proto_4.php.
214. See Lanctot, supra note 73, at 985.
215. See, e.g., Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 78, at 364; see Miller, supra note 79, at
1296 (noting that government attorneys act in the context of their role in one branch of the
government).
216. See, e.g., Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 78, at 379; Diehm, supra note 75, at
290; Green, supra note 73, at 265–66. R
217. See Diehm, supra note 75, at 293 (noting in the context of defending personal injury
actions against the government that public interest considerations countenance “assertion of de-
fenses and advocacy appropriate to our adversary system”). But see Green, supra note 73, at 274 R
(suggesting that “it is wrong for the government to assert every plausible claim or defense” in
every case).
218. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 1, at 37.
